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NOTE
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION AFTER
OREGON v. MA THIASON
In Miranda v. Arizona,' the Supreme Court established procedural
safeguards protecting an individual's privilege against self incrimina-
tion while in custody "or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the au-
thorities in any significant way ... ."' Since that decision in 1966
courts have had to determine whether those safeguards-the famous
"Miranda warnings" 3-apply in a wide variety of factual situations
short of formal arrest.' This determination is often crucial; if the de-
fendant is in "custody," no statements made by him in response to po-
lice5 questioning may be used against him at trial unless the
prosecution can show that he had first received Miranda warnings and
had waived his rights thereunder. 6
In the 1977 case of Oregon v. Mathiason,7 the Supreme Court nar-
rowly construed the language of Miranda, holding that "Miranda
warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a
person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.' "8 The Mathiason
Court overturned a ruling of the Oregon Supreme Court that an indi-
vidual who was questioned in a "coercive environment" had been sub-
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Id at 478.
3. [U]nless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of
silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the
following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he
has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of
law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Oppor-
tunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation.
Id at 479.
4. See Kamisar, "Custodial Interrogation" Within the Meaning of Miranda, in CRIMINAL
LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 333 (1968); Graham, What is "Custodial Interrogation?" Califor-
nia's Anticipatory Application ofMiranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 59 (1966); Smith, The
Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial Interrogation?, 25 S.C. L.
REV. 699 (1974); Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970 & Supp. 1978).
5. The term "police," as used in this Note, includes other law enforcement authorities as
well (e.g., F.B.I. and Secret Service agents, sheriff's department staff, county detectives, etc.) un-
less the context indicates a more narrow application. Likewise, the term "police station," when
used in a general sense, includes sheriff's offices and similar locations.
6. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
7. 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam). Mathiason has been noted in the following law jour-
nals: 5 AM. J. CRIM. LAW 334 (1977); 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1222 (1977); 23 Loy. L. REv. 1057
(1977); 57 ORE. L. REV. 184 (1977).
8. 429 U.S. at 495.
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jected to a "custodial interrogation" 9 within the meaning of Miranda,
even though he had come to the station voluntarily in response to a
state policeman's request and had been told that he was not under ar-
rest. 10
Mathiason has been widely viewed as a significant contraction of
the rights of the accused and as a possible augur of further contractions
in the future." This Note will examine the impact of Mathiason in
light of the previous case law under Miranda and, more particularly,
will examine post-Mathiason lower court cases for trends emerging in
the application of Mathiason. It will conclude that state and lower fed-
eral courts do not seem to be interpreting Mathiason as a signal for
sharp curtailment of Miranda rights, but rather are largely limiting the
case's application to the specific fact situation in which it arose.
I. MIRANDA AND "CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION"
The threshold issue with respect to the applicability of Miranda's
procedural requirements is clearly "custodial interrogation": "iT]he
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpa-
tory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self incrimination."' 2 Definition of the phrase "custo-
dial interrogation" has proven troublesome, ' 3 however, and courts and
9. State v. Mathiason, 275 Or. 1, 4-5, 549 P.2d 673, 675 (1976).
10. Id at 3, 549 P.2d at 674.
11. Justice Stevens, in a dissent joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart and Marshall, has cited
Mahiason as authority for the proposition that "the State's duty to give advice to an accused is
contracting . Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 160 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also
note 67 infra.
It should be noted that the Mathiason decision was presaged by some lower court decisions.
A 1974 survey concluded: "Of all the aspects of the issue of custodial interrogation, the cases in
which the subject has been 'invited' to the station for questioning are by far the least protective of
individual rights. Indeed, some of the decisions in this area are nothing short of amazing." Smith,
supra note 4, at 728.
12. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Where there is no custodial interrogation, however, statements
made to the police are admissible into evidence regardless of whether Miranda warnings are
given. The Miranda Court stressed that
[amny statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of
course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental import of the privilege while an indi-
vidual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit
of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. There is no requirement
that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess
to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement
he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth
Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.
Id at 478 (footnote omitted).
13. Courts have had much less difficulty in determining what constitutes "interrogation" than
in deciding what constitutes "custody." Miranda itself clearly excludes "volunteered statements of
any kind." 384 U.S. at 478. See generally Smith, supra note 4, at 702-06.
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commentators alike have suggested several different tests for determin-
ing whether an interrogation is custodial. These tests include objective
and subjective formulations and a standard focusing on whether suspi-
cion in a given case has centered on one particular individual.
The Miranda Court stated that "[b]y custodial interrogation, we
mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way."' 4 That definition, however, was compli-
cated by a footnote which seemingly equated "custodial interrogation"
with "focus," as that term had been used in Escobedo v. Illinois.5 In
Escobedo the Court held that the sixth amendment right to counsel
attached when an "investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect .... " 16
However, as the cases that arose under Miranda have made clear, these
two concepts are not in fact identical. Police may question an individ-
ual upon whom their suspicions have focused entirely without arresting
that person or in any way interfering with his freedom of movement;
the converse is also true.
Nonetheless, in an attempt to give some meaning to that language,
a few courts used "focus" as the major factor in determining whether
interrogation was custodial and, thus, whether Miranda warnings were
required. 7 In Beckwith v. United States, I8 the Supreme Court rejected
this position, holding that focus alone, without any other indicium of
custody, does not trigger the necessity for Miranda warnings.1 9
14. 384 U.S. at 444 (footnote omitted).
15. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). "This is what we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investiga-
tion which had focused on an accused." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 n.4. Professor Kenneth W.
Graham in his 1966 article referred to this as the "obfuscating footnote." Graham, supra note 4,
at 114. That term has stuck and is widely used in the literature on the subject.
16. 378 U.S. at 490-91.
17. In People v. Reed, 393 Mich. 342, 224 N.W.2d 867, cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1044 (1975), the
Michigan Supreme Court held that where suspicion had focused on a suspect prior to questioning
it was error to admit into evidence his responses to questions asked prior to his receiving Miranda
warnings. See also People v. Ridley, 396 Mich. 603, 242 N.W.2d 402 (1976); People v. Martin, 78
Mich. App. 518, 521, 260 N.W.2d 869, 870 (1977). The Martin court stated: "Our research dis-
closes no other state which has adopted the 'Focus Standard.'" Id at 526 n.5, 260 N.W.2d at 873
n.5. However, at least two other jurisdictions could arguably be said to have adopted focus as an
alternative test. In State v. Kalai, 56 Hawaii 366, 537 P.2d 8 (1975), the Hawaii Supreme Court
intimated that Miranda warnings must be given prior to police questioning of a suspect upon
whom suspicions had focused to the extent that police would have been justified in arresting him
without a warrant. See State v. Patterson, - Haw. -, 581 P.2d 752, 754 (1978) (discussing Kalat).
See text accompanying notes 128-34 infra for a discussion of the status of "focus" as a test in
Pennsylvania.
18. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
19. The Beckwith Court wrote:
Although the "focus" of the investigation may indeed have been on Beckwith at the time
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The great majority of jurisdictions and commentators had rejected
the use of focus as the sole test of custodial interrogation even before
Beckwith.2" Most courts agreed that the proper test was an objective
determination 2' whether the defendant actually had been taken into
custody, "or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any signifi-
cant way,"' 22 although they varied in their precise formulations. Some
of the interview in the sense that it was his tax liability which was under scrutiny, he
hardly found himself in the custodial situation described by the Miranda Court as the
basis for its holding. Miranda implicitly defined "focus," for its purposes, as "question-
ing initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
425 U.S. at 347 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, and supplying emphasis).
For the reactions of Michigan courts to Beckwith, see People v. Robinson, 79 Mich. App. 145,
153 n.5, 261 N.W.2d 544, 548-49 n.5 (1977) (on the facts of the case the court found "no reason to
reassess the position of the Michigan courts" in light of Beckwith); People v. Martin, 78 Mich.
App. 518, 521-25, 260 N.W.2d 869, 870-72 (1977) (abandoning focus as a standard). For the reac-
tion of the Pennsylvania courts, see text accompanying notes 128-34 infra; also see Common-
wealth v. Anderson, - Pa. Super. -. , 385 A.2d 365, 372-73 n.13 (1978).
Interestingly, in a post-Beckwith case the New Mexico Court of Appeals stated that "[w]hen
an investigation has focused on the accused he is entitled to the Miranda safeguards." State v.
Wheeler, _ N.M. _, 583 P.2d 480, 481 (1978). However, the statement is merely dictum, since
the statements suppressed in that case were made in response to police questioning when the
defendant was undisputedly "not free to go," 583 P.2d at 481, and by any test there was a custodial
interrogation.
20. An influential and frequently cited case taking this position is United States v. Hall, 421
F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970), in which Judge Friendly wrote:
It is. . .plain that "focus" alone does not trigger the need for Miranda warnings.
As appears from . . . E.scobedo ... custody as well as focus and other factors were
essential to that decision. Under Miranda custody alone suffices . . . . We fail to per-
ceive how one can reason from these two propositons to a conclusion that "focus" alone
is enough to bring Miranda into play. The only possible basis for such an argument
would be that, after limiting Miranda to custodial interrogation and defining this as
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way,"
Chief Justice Warren dropped a footnote:4 This is what we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investigation which
had focused on an accused.
While much dialectic skill has been expended on this footnote. . . the one thing that is
undeniable is that the opinion said that focus means custody, not that custody means
focus. As Professor Kamisar has put it, "Miranda's use of'custodial interrogation' actu-
ally marks afresh start in describing the point at which the Constitutional protections
begin," . . . -Fifth Amendment protections, that is.
Id at 543 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 & n.4, and Kamisar, supra note 4, at 339) (citations
omitted).
21. This was Judge Friendly's position in Hall:
The test must be an objective one. Clearly the Court meant that sonelhing more
than official interrogation must be shown. It is hard to suppose that suspicion alone was
thought to constitute that something; almost all official interrogation of persons who later
become criminal defendants stems from that very source. While the Court's language in
Miranda was imprecise, doubtless deliberately so, it conveys a flavor of some affirmative
action by the authorities other than police interrogation. . . . JI]n the absence of actual
arrest something must be said or done by authorities, either in their manner of approach
or in the tone or extent of their questioning, which indicates that they would not have
heeded a request to depart or to allow the suspect to do so.
421 F.2d at 544-45 (emphasis in original).
22. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
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spoke of determining "whether a reasonable man in defendant's posi-
tion would have believed that he was not free to leave [or] ... was 'in
custody' .;23 others qualified this test by speaking of "a reasonable
man, innocent of any crime";2 4 and others attempted to construct
multi-factor tests.25 Among the commmentators there has also been
support for a more subjective test-one that would exclude from evi-
dence answers to police questions by one who believed, even
unreasonably, that his freedom of movement was restricted. 6  This
suggestion, however, has generally been rejected by the courts.27
23. People v. Aikens, 72 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 11, 15, 140 Cal. Rptr. 135, 137 (1977) (citing
People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 449, 426 P.2d 515, 522, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115, 122 (1967)). Numer-
ous other decisions have employed this "reasonable man" test. See, e.g., Lowe v. United States,
407 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1969); State v. Hatton, 116 Ariz. 142, 568 P.2d 1040 (1977); Myers v. State,
3 Md. App. 534, 240 A.2d 288 (1968); People v. P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 255, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225
(1967); Commonwealth v. Brown, 473 Pa. 562, 375 A.2d 1260 (1977). In New York, however, the
test was later modified to that of the "reasonable innocent man" in People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585,
256 N.E.2d 172, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851 (1970).
24. People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, 589, 256 N.E.2d 172, 174, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857, 860 (1969),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851 (1970). Cases in other jurisdictions adopting this test include, e.g., Hicks
v. United States, 382 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1967); People v. Wipfler, 68 Ill. 2d 158, 368 N.E.2d 870
(1977).
25. For example,
The Fifth Circuit employs a four-factor test to ascertain whether an interrogation oc-
curred in a custodial context. These factors include: (1) whether probable cause to arrest
had arisen, (2) whether the subjective intent of the officer conducting the interrogation
was to hold the defendant, (3) whether the subjective belief of the defendant was that his
freedom was significantly restricted, and (4) whether the investigation had focused on the
defendant at the time of interrogation.
United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1071 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing numerous cases). While two
of the factors identified are subjective in nature, the test seems to be applied with the goal of
making an objective determination whether an interrogation is in fact custodial.
The Louisiana state courts have applied a similar test. See State v. Hodges, 349 So.2d 250,
255 (La. 1977), and cases cited therein. The Louisiana formulation stresses the objective nature of
the test by speaking in terms of "statements or actions indicating" an intent or belief, id (quoting
State v. Carey, 339 So.2d 804 (La. 1976)), rather than in terms of "subjective intent" or "subjective
belief."
26. The argument for a subjective test is that "the person who honestly but unreasonably
thinks he is under arrest has been subject to precisely the same custodial pressures as the person
whose belief in this regard is reasonable." LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution:
Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MiCH. L. REv. 39, 105 (1968); see Rothblatt & Pitler, Police
Interrogation: Warnings and Waivers-Where Do We Go From Here?, 42 NOTRE DAME LAw. 479,
485 (1967).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990
(1970), in which Judge Friendly argued against any purely subjective test:
The Court could scarcely have intended the issue whether the person being interrogated
had "been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in any significant way"
to be decided by swearing contests in which officers would regularly maintain their lack
of intention to assert power over a suspect save when the circumstances would make
such a claim absurd, and defendants would assert with equal regularity that they consid-
ered themselves to be significantly deprived of their liberty the minute officers began to
inquire of them. Moreover, any formulation making the need for Miranda warnings
depend upon how each individual being questioned perceived his situation would re-
quire a prescience neither the police nor anyone else possesses. On the other hand, a
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In conjunction with an objective test, focus of the investigation has
often been identified (both before and after Beckwith) as one of the
more significant factors in determining whether a given interrogation is
custodial.28 Other factors often mentioned include the subjective intent
of the officers to restrict the individual's freedom of movement,29 the
subjective belief of the individual being questioned as to his freedom of
movement,30 the existence of probable cause to arrest,31 the length and
form of the questioning,32 and the place of interrogation. 33
This last factor, place of questioning, was extremely important in
the factual situations before the Court in Miranda34 and, whether
clearly articulated or not, loomed large in the subsequent opinions of
various courts as to the custodial or noncustodial nature of an interro-
gation. Writing for the Court in Miranda, Chief Justice Warren dis-
cussed at great length the particular danger of coercion associated with
interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere,3" of which the police
station is the quintessential example. This emphasis led several early
commentators to suggest that all police station interrogations are inher-
ently custodial.36
standard hinging on the inner intentions of the police would fail to recognize Miranda's
concern with the coercive effect of the "atmosphere" from the point of view of the person
being questioned.
Id at 544. See also Smith, supra note 4, at 710-14.
28. E.g., Alberti v. Estelle, 524 F.2d 1265, 1267 (5th Cir. 1975), and cases cited therein; Peo-
ple v. Herdan, 42 Cal. App. 3d 300, 306-07, 116 Cal. Rptr. 641, 645 (1974); State v. Hodges, 349
So.2d 250, 255 (La. 1977), and cases cited therein; see, e.g., People v. White, 69 Cal. 2d 751, 761,
446 P.2d 993, 997-98, 72 Cal. Rptr. 873, 878 (1968). While rejecting focus alone as a determinative
test of custodial interrogation, Judge Friendly wrote in Hall:
This is not to say that the amount of information possessed by the police, and the conse-
quent acuity of their "focus," is irrelevant. The more cause for believing the suspect
committed the crime, the greater the tendency to bear down in interrogation and to cre-
ate the kind of atmosphere of significant restraint that triggers Miranda, and vice versa.
But this is simply one circumstance, to be weighed with all the others.
421 F.2d at 545.
29. See, e.g., Alberti v. Estelle, 524 F.2d 1265, 1267 (5th Cir. 1975), and cases cited therein;
cf. State v Hodges, 349 So.2d 250, 255 (La. 1977) ("statements or actions by the police indicating
an intention to hold or restrain [the person being questioned]").
30. See, e.g., Alberti v. Estelle, 524 F.2d 1265, 1267 (5th Cir. 1975); State v. Hodges, 249 So.
2d 250, 255 (La. 1977).
31. See cases cited at note 30 supra.
32. See, e.g., People v. Herdan, 42 Cal. App. 3d 300, 306-07, 116 Cal. Rptr. 641, 645 (1974),
and cases cited therein.
33. See id.; Commonwealth v. Haas, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2212, -, 369 N.E.2d 692, 698
(1977).
34. In each of the four cases before the Court in Miranda "the defendant was questioned by
police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the
outside world." 384 U.S. at 445. Indeed, in each case that room was located in a police station.
Id at 491-99.
35. Id at 445-58.
36. For example, Professor Kenneth W. Graham wrote in 1966: "If one assumes that the
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While subsequent cases showed little tendency to adopt such a
sweeping rule of law with respect to police station interrogations, 37
there was a definite correlation between the inherent coerciveness or
intimidating atmosphere of the place of interrogation and the likeli-
hood that courts would find a custodial interrogation to have taken
place.38  Custodial interrogation was found much more frequently
where the questioning occurred in a police vehicle or a police station,
sheriff's office or similar location.39 Thus, while neither focus on an
individual suspect nor police station interrrogation alone necessarily
constituted custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes, each was
considered to be a strong indicium that the custody requirement had
been met. However, the Supreme Court in Mathiason distinctly deem-
phasized the importance of these two factors.
II. THE MATHIASON DECISION
Both investigatory focus on the suspect and police station interro-
gation were present in Mathiason. The defendant had been suggested
to the police as a burglary suspect.4 0 After several unsuccessful at-
tempts to contact Mathiason, a state policeman left a note asking him
to call because the officer would "like to discuss something" with him.
Mathiason, a parolee,"1 called the following day and agreed to meet the
officer at a state patrol office.4 2 At the beginning of their interview,
interrogation requirement is met, it seems quite likely that all stationhouse interrogations will be
held to be custodial in nature, whether the suspect came of his own accord, or at the suggestion of
a parent, attorney, or military superior." Graham, supra note 4, at 82. Graham based this conclu-
sion on the experience of the California courts in applying Escobedo. "The California cases seem
to support the position that all police station interrogation is impermissible." Id 100-01. These
decisions in many other respects successfully anticipated the Supreme Court's holdings in
Miranda. Id 62.
37. One exception involved the California Court of Appeals, which stated in dictum: "Usu-
ally, interrogation at a police station is deemed inherently coercive . People v. Herdan, 42
Cal. App. 3d 300, 307 n.9, 116 Cal. Rptr. 641, 645 n.9 (1974).
38. Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565, 576 (1970).
39. Id 629-38.
40. "An officer of the State Police investigated a theft. . . .He asked the lady of the house
which has been burglarized if she suspected anyone. She replied that the defendant was the
only one she could think of. The defendant was a parolee and a 'close associate' of her son."
Maihiason, 429 U.S. at 493 (quoting 275 Or. at 3, 549 P.2d at 674). The United States Supreme
Court quoted the Oregon Supreme Court's summary of the facts in the Mathiason case, 275 Or. at
3-4, 549 P.2d at 674, nearly verbatim. 429 U.S. at 493-94.
41. As a parolee, Mathiason might have believed more reasonably than another man that he
had no real freedom to refuse to meet with the officer and answer questions. See note 57 infra for
a discussion of the significance of status as a parolee in determining whether interrogation is
custodial.
42. When Mathiason called, the officer asked where it would be convenient to meet.
Mathiason expressed no preference, and the officer asked him to come down to the state patrol
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which took place behind closed doors, the officer told Mathiason that
he was not under arrest but that the police suspected him of burglary
and that his truthfulness would possibly be considered by the judge or
prosecutor. He also falsely told Mathiason that his fingerprints had
been found at the scene of the crime a.4  After sitting for a few minutes,
the defendant said that he had taken the property. At that point he was
advised of his Miranda rights, and the officer took a taped confession.
At the close of the interview, which lasted about half an hour,
Mathiason was allowed to leave.
The Oregon Supreme Court found the interrogation to have been
custodial.' It reasoned that under Miranda, "[t]he most compulsive
feature of in-custody interrogation. . . is a person's belief that he can-
not leave or break off the interrogation" 45 and that warnings are re-
quired "if the questioning takes place in a 'coercive environment.' "46
By a four to three majority the Oregon court held that Mathiason's
interrogation took place in a "coercive environment" since "[t]he par-
ties were in the offices of the State police; they were alone behind
closed doors; the officer informed the defendant he was a suspect in a
theft and the authorities had evidence incriminating him in the crime;
and the defendant was a parolee under supervision. ' 47 The court felt
that "this evidence [was] not overcome by the evidence that the defend-
ant came to the office in response to a request and was told he was not
under arrest."'48 The court acknowledged that there was some contrary
authority in other jurisdictions, 49 but stated that "to hold that the con-
fession in the present case was not obtained as a result of 'custodial
interrogation' would be contrary to the rationale expressed in
Miranda.' 0
office in an hour and a half. 429 U.S. at 493 (quoting 275 Or. at 3, 549 P.2d at 674).
43. 429 U.S. at 493. In its opinion the Oregon Supreme Court did not mention that the
information about the fingerprints was false. That fact appears in the decision of the Oregon
Court of Appeals. State v. Mathiason, 22 Or. App. 494, 495, 539 P.2d 1122, 1123 (1975).
44. The trial court and the Oregon Court of Appeals had reached the opposite conclusion. 22
Or. App. at 494, 539 P.2d at 1122.
45. 275 Or. at 4, 549 P.2d at 675.
46. Id (quoting State v. Travis, 250 Or. 213,218,441 P.2d 597, 599 (1968)). The court added:
"We believe this is an accurate paraphrase of the idea expressed by the majority in
Miranda when the Chief Justice wrote about 'the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process
of in-custody interrogation.'" 275 Or. at 4-5, 549 P.2d at 675 (quoting 384 U.S. at 478).
47. 275 Or. at 5, 549 P.2d at 675.
48. Id
49. The court cited People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, 256 N.E.2d 172, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1969),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851 (1970), but noted that "[t]hree judges violently dissented in that case."
275 Or. at 5, 549 P.2d at 675.
50. 275 Or. at 5, 549 P.2d at 675.
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This judgment was reversed by the United States Supreme Court,
which found that the Oregon court had "read Miranda too broadly
. . ,1' Finding that it was "clear from [the] facts that Mathiason was
not in custody 'or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way,' "52 the Court held that "[s]uch a noncustodial situation
is not converted into one in which Miranda applies simply because a
reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any formal arrest
or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a
'coercive environment.' 553
The Court noted that all interviews of suspects by police officers
have coercive aspects "simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer
is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the
suspect to be charged with a crime," but added that "police officers are
not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they
question."'54 The Court found no requirement of warnings "simply be-
cause the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the
questioned person is one whom the police suspect." '  Rather,
"Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a re-
striction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.' It was
that sort of coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was
made applicable, and to which it is limited."56
Justices Brennan and Stevens dissented from the summary dispos-
tion of Mathiason,57 and Justice Marshall, for two reasons, dissented on
51. 429 U.S. at 493.
52. Id at 495 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444).
53. 429 U.S. at 495.
54. Id
55. Id
56. Id (emphasis in original).
57. Mathiason was decided without full argument. In addition, the record of the case had not
been transmitted to the Supreme Court. Thus, the Court's knowledge of the facts was "limited to
the information contained in the petition and in the opinions of the state courts." 429 U.S. at 497
n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens in his dissent stated that "the issues presented by this case are too important to
be decided summarily." Id at 499.
Of particular importance is the fact that the respondent was on parole at the time of his
interrogation in the police station. This fact lends support to inconsistent conclusions.
On the one hand, the State surely has greater power to question a parolee about his
activities than to question someone else. Moreover, as a practical matter, it seems un-
likely that a Miranda warning would have much effect on a parolee's choice between
silence and responding to police interrogation. Arguably, therefore, Miranda warnings
are entirely inappropriate in the parole context.
On the other hand, a parolee is technically in legal custody continuously until his
sentence has been served. Therefore, if a formalistic analysis of the custody question is
to determine when the Miranda warning is necessary, a parolee should always be
warned. Moreover, Miranda teaches that even if a suspect is not in custody, warnings
are necessary if he is "otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
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the merits. First, he thought that the meager record before the Court 8
was inadequate to sustain a factual determination that Mathiason had
not "been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way."59 Justice Marshall's second ground for
disagreement was more fundamental: "I cannot agree with the Court's
conclusion that if respondent were not in custody no warnings were
required. I recognize that Miranda is limited to custodial interroga-
tions, but that is because, as we noted last term, the facts in the
Miranda cases raised only this 'narrow issue.' "60 But, Justice Marshall
opined, "[tlhe rationale of Miranda. . .is not so easily cabined.'
Justice Marshall pointed out that Miranda required warnings "to
'combat' a situation in which there are 'inherently compelling pressures
which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel
him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.' "62 He con-
way." If a parolee being questioned in a police station is not described by that language,
today's decision qualifies that part of Miranda to some extent.
Id at 499-500 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444); see Jones v. Cunning-
ham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963), in which a parolee was held to be "in custody" so as to give the federal
courts jurisdiction to hear his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
One post-Mathiason case in which no requirement of Miranda warnings was found when a
parolee was questioned is In re Richard T., 79 Cal. App. 3d 382, 144 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1978). The
juvenile parolee's parole officer suspected him of a parole violation and asked the youth to accom-
pany him to the parole office to investigate the matter. On route the officer questioned the youth
about the alleged violation-possession of a gun-without giving him Miranda warnings. It later
developed that the gun was stolen, and the parolee was charged with receiving stolen property.
The Court held that the youth's answers to the officer's questioning were admissible: "In the con-
text of this case we hold that there was no custodial interrogation as the term is defined in
Miranda. . . . [A]Ithough parolees are entitled to the protections afforded by the Miranda warn-
ings, not every contact arising out of the parole relationship requires such warning." Id at 389,
144 Cal. Rptr. at 860 (citations omitted).
Faced with the somewhat analogous question of whether a person released on bail is "in
custody" for Miranda purposes, two panels of the Illinois Court of Appeals have reached seem-
ingly opposite conclusions. In People v. Petty, 54 111. App. 3d 1044, 370 N.E.2d 553 (1977), the
court held that Miranda warnings were required when a suspect who was out on bail was given a
polygraph test:
Defendant. . .had been formally charged with a crime and arrested prior to the time of
his examination. Any freedom to depart. . . was a result only of his admission to bail.
The questioning was related to an accusatory rather than investigatory stage of proceed-
ings; hence the protection of Miranda warnings was required.
Id at 1049, 370 N.E.2d at 557. In Petty, the defendant had received the warnings and was found
to have waived his rights under them. In People v. Roberson, 46 Ill. App. 3d 750, 361 N.E.2d 116
(1977), a policeman questioned a suspect who had just been released on bail, eliciting an incrimi-
nating statement about another crime. Relying on Maihiason the court held the statement admis-
sible "for the reason that [defendant] was not in custody at the time." Id at 755, 361 N.E.2d at
120.
58. See note 57 supra.
59. 429 U.S. at 496 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444).
60. Id. at 497 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Beckwith, 425 U.S. at 345).
61. Id. at 497 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
62. Id at 497-98 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
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cluded:
[F]aithfulness to Miranda requires us to distinguish situations that
resemble the "coercive aspects" of custodial interrogation from those
that more nearly resemble "[gleneral on the scene questioning. . . of
citizens in the fact finding process" which Miranda states usually can
take place without warnings ...
In my view, even if respondent were not in custody, the coercive
elements in the instant case were so pervasive as to require Miranda-
type warnings. . . . I therefore agree with the Oregon Supreme
Court that to excuse the absence of warnings given [on the facts of
this case] is "contrary to the rationale expressed in Miranda."63
Justice Marshall's dissent, like the opinion of the Oregon Supreme
Court, reflects a conviction that the individual who "voluntarily" sub-
mits to a "request" to answer questions (and who in a technical sense
may be "free" to walk out of the station at any time) is in reality subject
to much the same coercive atmosphere and tactics as the person actu-
ally placed under arrest or otherwise restrained. Under this view, po-
lice questioning of an individual in a "coercive environment" violates
the "complex of values" upon which the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation is founded64 regardless of whether that questioning is "custo-
63. Id. at 498 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477, and 275 Or. at 5,
549 P.2d at 675). Justice Marshall identified the following as "coercive elements" in Mathiason:
Respondent was interrogated in "privacy" and in "unfamiliar surroundings," factors on
which Miranda places great stress. [Miranda, 384 U.S.] at 449-50; see also Beckwith .
United States, [425 U.S.] at 346 n.7. The investigation had focused on respondent. And
respondent was subjected to some of the "deceptive stratagems," Miranda v. Arizona,
[384 U.S.] at 455, which called forth the Miranda decision.
429 U.S. at 498 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority rejected reliance upon a "coercive envi-
ronment" or upon the fact that the investigation had focused on the defendant in establishing that
there had been a custodial interrogation. See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra. With respect
to the officer's false statement concerning fingerprints (Marshall's last "coercive element"), the
majority wrote: "Whatever relevance this fact may have to other issues in the case, it has nothing
to do with whether respondent was in custody for purposes of the Miranda rule." 429 U.S. at 495-
96.
64. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55-57 n.5
(1964), and Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414-15 n.12 (1966)).
In the case of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), in which the privilege against self-incrimination
was extended to juvenile proceedings, Justice Fortas wrote:
The roots of the privilege [against self-incrimination] . tap the basic stream of reli-
gious and political principle because the privilege reflects the limits of the individual's
attornment to the state and-in a philosophical sense-insists upon the equality of the
individual and the state. . . . [T]he privilege has a broader and deeper thrust than the
rule which prevents the use of confessions which are the products of coercion because
coercion is thought to carry with it the danger of unreliability. One of its purposes is to
prevent the state, whether by force or by psychological domination, from overcoming the
mind and will of the person under investigation and depriving him of the freedom to
decide whether to assist the state in securing his conviction.
Id at 47. Under such an analysis it would not seem that the state should be permitted to employ
that "psychological domination" in a coercive but noncustodial situation any more than in a cus-
todial one.
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dial" in a narrow sense of the word.
The majority opinion, however, emphasized that the psychological
compulsion of an intimidating atmosphere, even when coupled with an
additional coercive factor such as the individual's knowledge that he is
the prime suspect in a police investigation, is not sufficient to render an
interrogation "custodial." The majority implied that only an actual ar-
rest or some definite physical restraint on a person's movements will
constitute "custody or other significant deprivation of freedom of ac-
tion."65 This emphasis on actual, physical custody caused Justice Mar-
shall to add a footnote to his dissent stating: "I trust that today's
decision does not suggest that police officers can circumvent Miranda
by deliberately postponing the official 'arrest' and the giving of
Miranda warnings until the necessary incriminating statements have
been obtained."66
III. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE MATHIASON DECISION
Shortly after it was handed down, Ma/hiason, with its emphasis on
actual, physical custody and its denigration of "coercive atmosphere"
as a factor in determining whether police interrogations are custodial,
was widely viewed as a significant contraction of the rights of the ac-
cused.67 It might well have been expected that Mathiason would herald
a new era in which the number of situations requiring Miranda warn-
ings would be greatly reduced. This is especially so in light of the
strong opposition expressed by many judges68 and others69 to the
Miranda doctrine at the time it was announced. Yet, although many
courts have had occasion to consider the questions presented by
Mathiason, few decisions have seized upon Mathiason as a justification
for further restrictions on the scope of Miranda. In fact, some courts
have confined Mathiason narrowly to its fats and have refused to ap-
65. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
66. 429 U.S. at 499 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67. The director of the American Civil Liberties Union was quoted in the New York Times
as saying that Mathiason "very substantially negates the Miranda decision." N.Y. Times, Jan. 26,
1977, § A, at 14, col. 4. Another commentator opined that Mathiason "[limited] Miranda's appli-
cation and [gave] police investigators an essentially free hand in interrogation." Keefe, Conf.es-
sions, Admissions and the Recent Curtailment of the Fifth Amendment Protection, 51 CoNN. B.J.
266, 282 (1977). Student commentators are also in substantial agreement. See authorities listed at
note 7 supra.
68. "[O]n the basis of four lively workshop sessions... with the Chief Justices of the States
at the [1966] Meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices . . . .I would have to say they were
overwhelmingly opposed to the recent confession rulings." Kamisar, 4 Dissentfrom the Miranda
Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65
MICH. L. REv. 59, 59 n.3 (1966).
69. For a sample of public reaction, see TIME, June 24, 1966, at 53-54.
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ply its holding in similar situations, despite the exhortation of prosecu-
tors.
In most of the cases in which Mathiason has been held controlling,
the fact situations have been analogous to that in Mathiason itself. A
number involved individuals who had, upon police request, presented
themselves at the stationhouse for questioning,7" taken a polygraph
test,7 ' or had a photograph72 or fingerprints73 taken. Similarly, in some
cases the defendant heard that the police were looking for him and
voluntarily appeared at the station, 74 or knew that he was under suspi-
cion and appeared without any police prompting to make self-serving
statements.75
70. For example, in People v. Wipfler, 68 Ill. 2d 158, 368 N.E.2d 870 (1977), a detective
called at the home of the 18-year-old defendant and told the youth's mother that he wanted to
speak with her son about some burglaries. She said that she would tell the youth to go to the
police station after school. There two officers questioned him behind closed doors, eliciting a
confession. The Illinois Supreme Court, after reviewing Mathiason, concluded that Wipfler had
not been subjected to custodial interrogation:
[T]he record supports the interpretation that defendant was not compelled to come to the
station, much less to answer questions, and that, regardless of defendant's subjective
beliefs, he was not, and would not have been, forbidden to leave. The officers testified
that he would have been permitted to leave because "there was nothing to hold him for."
In short, when the situation is viewed objectively, defendant was not in custody or other-
wise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, and so Miranda warnings
were not required at the outset of the interrogation.
Id at 170, 368 N.E.2d at 874-75 (citation omitted). However, two justices vigorously dissented:
The constitutional rights which Miranda was designed to protect are so important that
their effective exercise should not depend on the type ofjudicial hairsplitting present in
this and similar cases. . . . It would be remarkable indeed if under [these] circum-
stances an 18-year-old high school student reached any conclusion other than he was in
custody and that any attempt to leave would be unsuccessful.
Id at 175-76, 368 N.E.2d at 877 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).
In People v. Ellis, 91 Misc. 2d 28, 397 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1977), a woman had been found
dead in a hotel bathroom under highly suspicious circumstances, although the death was not ini-
tially listed as a homicide. A police detective left a message for the defendant to contact him.
Ellis appeared at the police station and, after answering some initial questions, voluntarily agreed
to accompany the detectives to a nearby precinct station where they could continue the interview
privately. The story he gave to the detectives was wholly exculpatory, but was contradicted in
important respects by the medical evidence. Analogizing the factual situation to that in
Mathiason, the court found that the interrogation was not custodial.
Other cases in this category include: People v. Liccione, 63 App. Div. 2d 305, 407 N.Y.S.2d
753 (1978); State v. Street, 572 P.2d 577 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977); State v. Johnson, __ R.I. __, 383
A.2d 1012 (1978); State v. Neeley, __ S.C. __, 244 S.E.2d 522 (1978). Cf State v. Martin, 294 N.C.
702, 242 S.E.2d 762 (1978) (defendant at police request left his home and came out to a patrol car
to answer questions). See also United States v. Kilbourne, 559 F.2d 1263 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 873 (1977).
71. People v. Varney, 58 Ill. App. 3d 70, 373 N.E.2d 1033 (1978); People v. McCue, 48 Ill.
App. 3d 41, 362 N.E.2d 760 (1977).
72. Starkey v. Wvyrick, 555 F.2d 1352 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 927 (1977).
73. Hancock v. Estelle, 558 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1977); Moore v. State, 344 So.2d 731 (Miss.
1977).
74. E.g., United States v. Shelly, 573 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1978).
75. State v. Falk, 17 Wash. App. 905, 567 P.2d 235 (1977).
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Some courts have used Mathiason as general support for findings
that police interrogation claimed by defendants to be custodial was in
fact "general on-the-scene questioning" permissible without Miranda
warnings." The Supreme Court in Miranda exempted from the re-
quirement of warnings "[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning as to facts
surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-
finding process. . . .,7 Differentiating this type of questioning from
According to the officer the defendant came to the station house on his own initiative,
not once but twice, after his release on bond. The information was not a response to
interrogation but was offered in an apparent attempt to gain some personal advan-
tage. . . The situation here was closely akin to that in Oregon v. Mathiason ....
which we believe is determinative of this issue.
Id at 908-09, 567 P.2d at 238.
While the Falk court relied on Mathiason, there is strong support for its conclusion in
Miranda itself. See 384 U.S. at 478, quoted at note 12 supra.
76. E.g., State v. Hilliard, 89 Wash. 2d 430, 573 P.2d 22 (1977). In that case the defendant
was questioned at the scene of an assault. He was under such suspicion that the police later
testified that they would not have allowed him to leave without accounting for his presence. How-
ever, the defendant was told that if his story checked out he would be allowed to go. Citing
Mathiason, the court held that "[t]he questioning of defendant was not a custodial interrogation.
Mere suspicion, before the facts are reasonably developed, is not enough to turn the questioning
into a custodial interrogation." Id at 436, 573 P.2d at 26. The Washington Court of Appeals has
since commented:
As we read Hilliard, it retreats slightly from the principle enunciated in State P.
Creach, 77 Wn.2d 194, 461 P.2d 329 (1969) that the interrogation must be under circum-
stances where there is absolutely no pressure from police presence and that the subject
must be free to leave to any time. We feel that this retreat is a recognition of the reality
that it would be poor social policy to require the police to walk away from a situation
such as existed in Hilliard simply because there was as yet no probable cause to arrest,
although the circumstances were suspicious and required investigation.
State v. Webster, 20 Wash. App. 128, -, 579 P.2d 985, 989 (1978).
Similarly, in Adkins v. Commonwealth, _ Va. _, 243 S.E.2d 205 (1978), the defendant was
stopped by police detectives and questioned concerning the ownership of a stereo and a television
set in his car. The defendant gave conflicting stories about the ownership of the items and waited
with the detectives for an unspecified length of time while they tried to determine whether the
items were stolen. Applying Mathiason, the court held: "The fact that the defendant's questioning
by the police concerning the ownership of the items may have caused him to feel that he was
deprived of his right to leave the scene does not require the Miranda warnings to be given." 243
S.E.2d at 208. See State v. Mitchell, 35 Or. App. 809, 583 P.2d 14 (1978), for another case similar
to Hilliard and Adkins.
State v. Ousley, - Minn. -, 254 N.W.2d 73 (1977), involved a woman whose young child
died in a bathtub drowning. She was subsequently charged with aggravated assault for a beating
that she allegedly gave the child a week earlier and sought unsuccessfully to exclude statements
she made to an investigating officer on the day of the drowning. The Minnesota court wrote:
If there were any doubts about the correctness of the [trial] court's ruling, and we do not
believe there were, those doubts were erased by the United States Supreme Court's re-
cent decision in Oregon v. Mathiason. . . .There the court emphasized that the test in
determining the need for a Miranda warning is not whether the interrogation has coer-
cive aspects to it or whether the person being interrogated is a suspect, but whether the
person is in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way. Here, defendant was not in custody nor was her freedom of action restricted in any
signficant way when the investigating officer questioned her at home.
254 N.W.2d at 73-74.
77. 384 U.S. at 477. Cases applying this "general on-the-scene questioning" rule are col-
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custodial interrogation poses some problems," especially since the
courts have acknowledged that on-the-scene questioning not requiring
Miranda warnings often involves an element of detention.79 While
Mathiason did not involve on-the-scene questioning, courts have used
its restrictive definition of custodial interrogation to buttress their con-
clusions that certain types of on-the-scene questioning are not custo-
dial.8 0
Mathiason has also been cited as authority by courts refusing to
extend the requirement of Miranda warnings to such contexts as the
testimony of a witness at the trial of another,8 an investigatory inter-
view by postal inspectors, 82 police questioning of hospital patients,83 a
coroner's interview with a mother he suspected of causing her child's
death84 and investigatory interviews into welfare fraud85 and child
lected in Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 § 3 (1970 & Supp. 1978). By analogy, courts have held that
routine traffic stops (e.g., Lowe v. United States, 407 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1969); Ford v. United
States, 376 A.2d 439 (D.C. App. 1977)), border patrol checks for entering aliens (Williams v.
United States, 381 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1967)), customs searches (United States v. Thompson, 475
F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1973)), and Coast Guard inspections of American vessels on the high seas
(United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978)) do not, without more, create custodial
situations.
78. See generally Kamisar, supra note 4, at 360-82; LaFave, supra note 26; Smith, supra note
4, at 714-18.
79. Eg., United States v. Clark, 425 F.2d 827, 832 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970);
Allen v. United States, 390 F.2d 476, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
80. See note 76 supra.
81. People v. Lamorie, - Colo. -, 560 P.2d 85 (1977). In that case the defendant had been
subpoenaed as a witness, but on the day of trial was given a flat option not to testify at all.
However, he insisted on testifying even after being told of his right to exercise the privilege against
self-incrimination. The defendant later sought to have the testimonial admissions he had made at
the trial suppressed when he was charged with perjury and attempted burglary. The court held
that "this was not the sort of 'custodial interrogation' which was intended to trigger the full com-
plement of protections outlined in Miranda v. Arizona ...." 560 P.2d at 87. While principal
reliance was placed upon United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976), Mathiason was cited
for the proposition that "mere existence of incidential coercive aspect and police suspicion does
not constitute 'custodial interrogation.'- 560 P.2d at 87.
82. United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 446 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 863 (1977). Al-
though the investigation triggered criminal proceedings and had focused on the defendant, there
was no custodial interrogation since "[a]s in Mathiason, the meeting was mutually arranged and
took place at a Government office after the [defendant] voluntarily presented himself there." 556
F.2d at 449.
83. People v. Clark, 55 Ill. App. 3d 496, 371 N.E.2d 33 (1977); State v. Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d
621 (Mo. 1977); c. State v. Franklin, 281 Md. 52, 58, 375 A.2d 1116, 1120 (1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1018 (1978) (court assumed that hospital interview of wounded attempted-robbery suspect
was custodial interrogation, adding "But see Oregon v. Mathiason...").
84. Commonwealth v. Anderson, __ Pa. Super. -, 385 A.2d 365 (1978).
85. Doe v. Chang, 58 Hawaii 94, 564 P.2d 1271 (1977). The plaintiff welfare recipients
sought to enjoin any such interviews from being conducted without Miranda warnings. The court
noted that the plaintiffs alleged no deprivation of their freedom of action "other than the con-
straint imposed by their assumption that cooperation with the questioners was a condition of
continued welfare benefits, nor have they alleged that they were informed that failure to provide
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abuse86 conducted by social workers. These cases are ones in which,
even before Mathiason, it is unlikely that the defendants would have
been able to persuade courts that there had been a custodial interroga-
tion within the meaning of Miranda. Given the restrictive view of cus-
todial interrogation espoused by the Mathiason Court, it is hardly
surprising that other courts are not finding a need for Miranda warn-
ings in contexts often far removed from the typical police interrogation.
What is perhaps surprising is that the state and lower federal
courts have shown little or no tendency to use Mathiason as a vehicle
for further contraction of Miranda rights by applying it outside its own
factual situation to cases in which Miranda warnings would previously
have been thought to be required. 7 Indeed, sometimes over vigorous
dissents, some courts have continued to find a need for Miranda warn-
ings in cases in which Mathiason arguably dictates the opposite result.
A prime example of such a case is United States v. DiGiacomo.88
In that case, two Secret Service agents approached the defendant and a
companion in a restaurant parking lot. They identified themselves and
said they wanted to talk about some counterfeit money that
such cooperation would result in any disadvantage to them." 564 P.2d at 1273-74. Mathiason was
quoted at some length to support the court's conclusion that the Miranda rule was not applicable.
d
86. People v. Easter, 90 Misc. 2d 748, 395 N.Y.S.2d 926 (County Ct. 1977). The defendant in
that case, aware that he was suspected of child abuse, had actually sought out the social worker.
87. One possible example of such a case, however, is Barfield v. Alabama, 552 F.2d 1114 (5th
Cir. 1977). Bertha Barfield had been named to the police as a possible murder suspect. She came
voluntarily to the police station for an interview, but was allegedly told that she could not leave.
The Fifth Circuit panel observed:
The force and effect of such a statement, assuming it was made. . . is diminished by the
fact that Barfield was left alone, her departure unimpeded by physical restraints or the
presence of other officers. When viewed in that light, [the officer's] alleged statement to
Barfield that she remain in the office seems more in the nature of a precatory request
than a command.
Id at 1118 (footnote omitted). The court cited United States v. Brunson, 549 F.2d 348, 357 nn. 12-
13 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 842 (1977). as authority for this conclusion. The court held that
the facts of the interrogation were so close to those in Mathiason as to render that case controlling.
Although this would seem to indicate a very restrictive view of what constitutes custodial interro-
gation, more restrictive than would be justified by Mathiason, it should be noted that Barfield's
incriminating statement was not actually made in response to interrogation by an officer; rather, as
the officer returned to the room in which he had left the defendant alone, he overheard her make
an inculpatory remark while talking to herself in a distraught manner.
Another decision that might possibly be read as going beyond Mathiason is United States v.
Long Soldier, 562 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1977), where the court stated: "Defendant's statements...
were admissible under the rationale of Oregon v. Mathiason. . .. where the Supreme Court held
that, absent a custodial arrest, interrogation of a suspect does not require Miranda warnings." Id
at 603 n.1 (emphasis added). The superficial rendition of the facts in that case makes it impossible
to tell whether the court's reference to "custodial arrest" goes beyond the Mathiason holding to
require an actual arrest, or is merely a slip.
88. 579 F.2d 1211 (10th Cir. 1978).
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DiGiacomo had spent. DiGiacomo agreed to wait with them until two
other agents arrived. At the suppression hearing89 the first two agents
testified that they, together with DiGiacomo and and his companion,
waited together in a group for approximately five minutes until the
other agents arrived. They further testified that they asked no ques-
tions at that time. The other agents, however, testified that when they
arrived DiGiacomo and his companion were separated, with each at-
tended by one of the agents already present. One of the late arrivals
also testified that when he had been summoned to come to the parking
lot, one of the other agents had said that the defendant was already
being interviewed.
After the arrival of the second set of agents DiGiacomo was given
an incomplete advisement of his rights.90 He allowed the agents to
check the currency he was carrying. A counterfeit bill was found, and
the agents informed DiGiacomo of the seriousness of the matter and
told him it would be to his advantage to tell the whole truth. He then
made an inculpatory statement to one of the agents. At some uncertain
point during the conversation an agent told DiGiacomo that they could
arrest him that night or he could cooperate, answer questions and ap-
pear voluntarily at the Secret Service office the following morning.
The trial court suppressed the defendant's statements and the gov-
ernment appealed, relying upon Mathiason to argue that the defendant
was not entitled to Miranda warnings because he had not been in cus-
tody during the interrogation. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
distinguished Mathiason on its facts and held that "[t]he trial court was
justified in holding that the agents' actions in the parking lot were
'functionally equivalent to an arrest.' "91
The court's holding and its distinguishing of Mathiason prompted
a vigorous dissent by Judge Barrett:
In my view, [the parking lot] encounter was such that the trial court
was clearly erroneous in finding that the ensuing interrogation of
DiGiacomo was "custodial" within the meaning of Miranda v.
89. The only evidence taken at the suppression hearing was the testimony of the four Secret
Service agents. Id at 1212.
90. There was conflicting testimony as to the content of the warnings given the defendant, id
at 1212-13, but the court upheld a trial court determination "that the government failed to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was advised of his right to appointed counsel
and his right to terminate questioning anytime." Id at 1214.
91. Id at 1214. The court went on to find "ample support in the record" for the lower court's
determination that DiGiacomo's appearance at the Secret Service office the following day was not
voluntary and that "proper Miranda warnings were necessary." Id The court determined that
proper warnings had been given at that time, but that the defendant had not waived his right to
counsel under them. Accordingly, further incriminating statements he made at that time were also
suppressed. Id at 1215.
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Arizona. . . .in light of the facts and circumstances related in Ore-
gon v. Mathiason ....
It is clear to me that the facts of the instant case fit within the
"four comers" of [Mathiason]. There is no evidence in the record
before us that the Secret Service agents. . . did other than request
that he remain in the parking lot until the other two agents arrived.
S. . [There is nothing in the record evidencing that DiGiacomo was
"deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." And any
reliance on "coercive environment" is dispelled by Mathiason.9 2
The majority opinion in DiGacomo is in fact difficult to reconcile
with Mathiason. Comparing the factual situations, there is no easily
apparent reason why Nicholas DiGiacomo should have been entitled
to Miranda warnings if Carl Mathiason was not. The Miranda warn-
ings were designed to combat what were perceived as "inherently com-
pelling pressures" in custodial interrogation-pressures which
endangered the privilege against self-incrimination.93 It is difficult to
see how the interrogation of DiGiacomo was any more "custodial"
than that of Mathiason, and the "inherently compelling pressures" on
DiGiacomo were arguably less. Both men were aware that they were
objects of investigations by the authorities, and both had been advised
to cooperate, but Mathiason was questioned alone in the seclusion of a
police station while DiGiacomo was accompanied by a friend and in a
public place.
The DiGiacomo court was not at -all precise in distinguishing
Mathiason; it merely summarized the facts of the two cases without
indicating the differences which it found to be crucial.9" Apparently,
the court viewed Mathiason as applicable only to a narrow class of
cases involving suspects who voluntarily present themselves for ques-
tioning in response to a police request 95 and as excluding all others to
which the Mathiason rationale might otherwise seem applicable.
There are other cases in which the courts' attempts to distinguish
Mathiason seem strained. In Commonwealth v. Brown,96 the defendant
accompanied police officers to the station, at their request, after specifi-
cally being told that he was not under arrest. He was questioned at
length and returned to the station the following day, again accompa-
92. Id at 1216-17 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The dissent went on to add:
"This approach applies with equal force to DiGiacomo's presence in the Secret Service agents'
office on the morning of July 27." Id at 1217.
93. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
94. 579 F.2d at 1214.
95. Since DiGiacomo himself had voluntarily remained in the parking lot for questioning at
the agents' request, id at 1212, the court may also have found some significance in the fact that,
unlike Mathiason, DiGiacomo was not specifically told that he was "not under arrest."
96. 473 Pa. 562, 375 A.2d 1260 (1977).
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nied by officers and at their request. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
in finding a custodial interrogation, distinguished Mathiason on the
grounds that although the defendant had been requested rather than
ordered to come to the police station, he "was not given any option as
to the time and place of questioning and was accompanied by police
officers both times he went to the Public Safety building." 97
It is true that in Mathiason the defendant was given such an option
rather than being asked, for example, "Would you please come down
to the station tomorrow to answer a few questions?" It is also true that
the officer did not walk to the station with Mathiason. Yet neither of
those factors seems to have been crucial to the rationale of the
Mathiason decision.98 The Brown court also noted that the appellant
was questioned repeatedly over two days and contrasted this with the
much briefer interrogation in Mathiason.99 Mathiason, however, was
not premised upon the relative brevity of the interrogation in that case.
The Pennsylvania court in Brown seems to have taken the position that
the cumulative effect of these relatively minor deviations from the
Mathiason facts was to require Miranda warnings.' In basic outline,
however, Mathiason and Brown presented similar factual situations,
differing in degree rather than in kind.''
Another case in which a court has found custodial interrogation
despite the insistence of the prosecution that Mathiason should control
is Commonwealth v. Haas."2 In that case, the defendant's wife and
children were found murdered in their home while he was at work.
There was at least some evidence pointing toward the defendant's in-
volvement in the crime, °3 and the chief of police instructed his men
97. Id at 572 n.6, 375 A.2d at 1265 n.6.
98. In State v. Neeley, - S.C. __, 244 S.E.2d 522 (1978), the defendant was accompanied by
officers when he agreed to go to the station for questioning. The South Carolina Supreme Court
had no difficulty applying Mathiason to that situation. 244 S.E.2d at 526-27. The same was true
in Malone v. State, 361 So. 2d 674 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978).
99. 473 Pa. at 572 n.6, 375 A.2d at 1265 n.6.
100. The court found the interrogations in the two cases to be "in marked contrast" when
taken as a whole, id, and added that
the mere fact that appellant, like Mathiason, was told he was not under arrest does not
mean that appellent was never subjected to custodial interrogation. . . .Nor can we
conclude that the questioning of appellant was not custodial interrogation simply be-
cause the police requested that appellant come to the Public Safety Building.
Id
101. In both cases suspects agreed to submit to police station questioning at police request. In
both they were specifically told they were not under arrest.
102. - Mass. -, 369 N.E.2d 692 (1977).
103. The front door of the house was ajar with a key in the lock; otherwise the house was in
order. The medical examiner informed the police that the murder victims had died between 3 and
5 a.m. A man working regular hours would generally be expected to be home at that time. In
addition, when Haas first called the police from work, to ask them to check the house, he stated
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not to let the defendant into his house, but rather to bring him to the
station and inform him of the deaths there. The house had been sealed
to all but police personnel. At the suppression hearing the Common-
wealth argued that humanitarian motive had prompted the police to
bar Haas from the murder scene. There was further testimony that
Haas had voluntarily accompanied the police to the station, where his
response to a police question proved incriminating 104 and prompted
his arrest.
The court's rationale for holding that the questioning of Haas was
custodial" 5 is interesting in light of Mathiason, upon which the Com-
monwealth had relied. The court seemed to advance the "coercive en-
vironment" argument that the Supreme Court had rejected in
Mathiason:
[T]he questioning took place in the environs of the ... police station
by conscious decision of the police .... The station house atmos-
phere is generally most conducive to successful interrogation because
the investigator "possess[es] all the advantages." . . . [T]he Com-
monwealth's argument that the police were motivated by humanita-
rian concerns does not detract from the atmosphere which the law
often recognizes as coercive nor does it obviate the need for Miranda
warnings.'0 6
That the investigation had begun to focus on Haas and that he was not
allowed to enter his home were among other facts listed in support of
the court's finding of custodial interrogation.
The court's observation that "we need not decide whether the po-
lice's action in refusing Haas entrance into his own home in the interest
of preserving the crime scene deprived Haas of his freedom of action in
a significant way"'0 7 is also notable, since there appears to be no indi-
cation that Haas's freedom of action was interfered with at any other
that he had received an anonymous phone call to the effect that "black and white don't mix." A
sign bearing an identical slogan was in fact found at the murder scene.
104. Haas told the police he had left home at 6:30 a.m., considerably later than the time of
death estimated by the medical examiner.
105. Chief Justice Hennessey's partial dissent seems to have concurred with the majority on
this point. See 369 N.E.2d at 706-07 (Hennessey, C.J., dissenting in part). Another justice wrote
that he felt the ruling to be required under Miranda, but added that it was "unjust":
Thus to curtail the evidence to be heard by the jury is not to improve the reliability
of the jury's verdict. The justification for the exclusion of reliable evidence is said to be
the deterrence of improper police conduct. But here the officers acted in good faith,
attempting to observe proper legal standards. Their violation of those standards was not
gross or wilful, was not of a kind likely to mislead the defendant, and did not create a
significant risk that his statement that he left home at 6:30 A.M. may have been untrue.
See Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 150.3 (1975).
369 N.E.2d at 705 (Braucher, J., concurring).
106. 369 N.E.2d at 698 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450) (citations omitted).
107. 369 N.E.2d at 699.
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time prior to his formal arrest. Yet Mathiason states plainly: "Miranda
warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a
person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.' " 08 In a footnote the
Haas court distinguished Mathiason "by the fact that Mathiason came
and left by his own choice. He arrived unaccompanied by anyone, and
after the interrogation he was free to leave."' t 9
United States v. Mc Cain' ° involved a customs inspection at
Miami International Airport. Customs agents suspected that the de-
fendant might be smuggling narcotics into the country,"' and she was
taken to a special room where two agents conducted a strip search. The
search uncovered no incriminating evidence, but while the defendant's
baggage was being checked a second time she was taken to another
office and given a seven or eight minute warning about the dangers of
carrying narcotics in body cavities." 2 At that point the defendant con-
fessed she was carrying narcotics in that manner. The court noted that
it would "utterly distort" Miranda to hold that routine customs inspec-
tions, which necessarily involve an element of detention, render a per-
son in custody." 3 But the court went on to find that defendant had
108. 429 U.S. at 495.
109. 369 N.E.2d at 699 n.7. With respect to the fact that officers accompanied Haas to the
station, see note 98 supra and accompanying text.
In People v. Liccione, 63 App. Div. 2d 305, 407 N.Y.S.2d 753 (1978), the court found no
custodial interrogation in a case factually similar to Haas. A woman who was fatally wounded by
an intruder accused her husband of having hired the assailant. When the husband arrived home
from work police detectives met him in the driveway and questioned him about several items of
evidence they had discovered. Several of the detectives knew of the woman's accusation but did
not inform the husband of it.
After about an hour, defendant was asked to go to the Public Safety Building for ques-
tioning and agreed to do so. The police officers testified that defendant was free to leave
at any time and that they did not seriously suspect him until [later] . . . . Defendant
testified that he believed he was in custody from the time he arrived [home] and that he
thought he had no choice but to go to the Public Safety Building when requested to do so
because he was under arrest.
Id. at 314, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 757. Applying the "reasonable innocent man" test, see text accompa-
nying note 24 supra, and citing Mathiason, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
held that the interrogation at defendant's home was not custodial. 63 App. Div. 2d at 315, 407
N.Y.S.2d at 758.
110. 556 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1977).
111. A customs inspector had noticed that the defendant appeared nervous, her voice cracked
and her clothing revealed a bulge in the abdominal area. Further, she was travelling alone, and
her trip to Colombia had been short in duration. Id at 254.
112. [T]he inspector talked to the defendant as "a father might talk to a daughter, and he
told her that these were very serious matters, that she could harm herself seriously, per-
haps even cause her death, if she was in fact carrying contraband in her body and if any
of these containers ruptured and this narcotic substance was in immediate contact with
her body or her internal organs."
Id (quoting the transcript of the trial in the district court). The defendant had previously been
shown a booklet of newspaper clippings about tragedies that had resulted under such circum-
stances. Id
113. Id at 255. See note 77 supra.
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been subjected to more than a routine customs detention and was in
custody for Miranda purposes 14 One circuit judge dissented, expres-
sing doubt that the defendant had been interrogated II or that she had
been any more in custody than had Carl Mathiason.
t
"
6
In DiGiacomo, Brown, Haas and McCain, courts sensitive to the
coercive potential of police interrogation all found a custodial interro-
gation requiring Miranda warnings, even though in each case the ra-
tionale of Mathiason might well have been taken to dictate the opposite
conclusion. There are also other indications that the concerns that mo-
tivated Justice Marshall's dissent in Mathiason"7 still occupy the
courts. For example, in one post-Mathiason decision' t8 a state court
indicated that questioning of a juvenile may be found to constitute cus-
todial interrogation where there would be none were an adult involved:
Adolescents are more likely to succumb to the inherently coercive
nature of police interrogation and the police should apply extra cau-
tion in dealing with juveniles .... A thirteen year old boy, with no
previous experience with the police, taken to a police station without
the benefit of parental guidance and subject to the pressures of an
authoritarian atmosphere is more likely to reasonably believe that he
114. 556 F.2d at 255 (citing United States v. Garcia, 496 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1974), cer. denied,
420 U.S. 960 (1975); United States v. Salinas, 439 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1971)).
115. "She was rather warned-granted in a manner most frightening-of the risk she was
running by carrying drugs internally. But the warning called for no response, and she knew when
she received it that she had nothing more to fear from a strip search: she had already passed one."
556 F.2d at 256 (Gee, J., dissenting).
116. I also doubt McCain was in custody. Certainly the search of her person has [sic]
been completed and she was not under formal arrest. She was merely waiting while her
luggage was re-checked. Persons in such circumstances-waiting while their luggage is
checked at the border-are not "in custody. ... It is true she was in a private room,
talking to the inspector. But so was Carl Mathiason. .. and so was Bertha Barfield...
and neither was held to have been in custody.
Id at 256-57 (Gee, J., dissenting). (The facts and holding in Barfield v. Alabama, 552 F.2d 1114
(5th Cir. 1977), are discussed at note 87 supra.)
With respect to their finding of custody, the majority in McCain wrote:
The government offered no testimony to the effect that Ms. McCain was free to leave
after the initial strip search. In fact, all the evidence is to the contrary. However, if we
were to assume Ms. McCain was not being physically restrained from leaving after the
strip search, she was obviously able to leave only if she was willing to abandon her
luggage, and this itself is a sufficient restriction on one's freedom of action so as to trigger
the giving of Miranda warnings before proceeding with any interrogation.
556 F.2d at 255.
117. See text accompanying notes 60-64 supra.
118. Inre Hector G., 89 Misc. 2d 1081, 393 N.Y.S.2d 519 (Fam. Ct. 1977). In that case, a 13-
year-old was asked by the police to accompany them to the precinct for further questioning. He
was first allowed to go to his apartment, unescorted, to change his clothing. At the station the
youth denied involvement in the crime. He was then told that if he told the "truth" he would be
out in a "jiffy"; some time later he made an incriminating statement. The youth was questioned in
a private room and was not give his Miranda warnings until after he made the incriminating
statement. Id at 1082, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 520. The court concluded that the statement was the
product of a custodial interrogation. Id at 1084, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
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is deprived of his freedom of movement. 19
Courts generally have not interpreted Mathiason as a signal for
substantial curtailment of the scope of Miranda protections, and the
fears of some that Mathiason would largely negate Miranda'20 seem to
have been premature. Mathiason, after all, was a brief per curiam
opinion decided upon a very skimpy record,12 ' and it did not deal with
many of the policy considerations discussed so exhaustively in
Miranda. Courts should hesitate to apply Mathiason beyond its own
factual situation without a clearer directive from the Supreme Court
that Miranda is indeed to be sharply restricted in its application.
122
Another indication of continuing concern with the possibilities of
coercion in police interrogations that are not "custodial" under the
Mathiason rationale is the search for independent state constitutional
requirements of Miranda-type warnings in such situations. Justice
Marshall in his Mathiason dissent wrote: "It is. . . important to note
that the state courts remain free, in interpretating [sic] state constitu-
tions, to guard against the evil clearly identified in this case." 123 Vari-
119. Id at 1084, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 521. In support of this conclusion the court quoted Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), a pre-Miranda case in which a 15-year-old boy's confession was held
involuntary: "[a juvenile] cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. That
which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overcome and overwhelm a lad in his early
teens." Id at 599 (opinion of Douglas, J., with three Justices concurring and one Justice concur-
ring in result).
120. See note 67 supra.
121. See note 57 supra and text accompanying notes 57-58 supra.
122. One possible indication that the Court does not intend any sharp cut-back on Miranda
rights came in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). The respondent in that case had been
arraigned and jailed in Davenport, Iowa for abducting a 10-year-old girl in Des Moines. He was
read his Miranda rights at that time. Attorneys advised him not to make any statement until he
had consulted his lawyer in Des Moines, and the policemen who were to drive him to Des Moines
agreed not to question him during the trip. However, one of the police officers knew that Williams
was a former mental patient and was deeply religious. During the drive that officer told Williams
that he thought they should stop and locate the girl's body so that she could be given a Christian
burial. During the trip Williams made several incriminating statements, finally directing police to
the body. Evidence relating to or resulting from Williams' statements was admitted at trial, and
he was convicted. In subsequent habeus corpus proceedings one of the bases for the district
court's conclusion that the evidence was wrongly admitted was that Williams had been denied the
protections defined by Miranda. Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170, 180 (S.D. Iowa), a#'d 509
F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1974), ajr'd430 U.S. 387 (1977). On certiorari the State of Iowa urged strenu-
ously that Airanda be overruled and that "[t]he sole constitutional requirement for admissibility
of an incriminating statement should be whether it is given voluntarily." Brief for Petitioner at 13,
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). An amicus brief filed by, inter alia, the National District
Attorneys Association and the Attorney Generals of twenty-one states also urged that Miranda be
"abandoned." Brief for Amici Curiae at 3. The Court, however, refrained from doing so, decid-
ing the case on the alternative grounds that Williams' sixth amendment right to counsel had been
infringed. "[T]here is no need to review in this case the doctrine of Miranda v. Arizona ....
430 U.S. at 397. Had substantial restrictions on Miranda been contemplated by the Court, Brewer
might have been a good case in which to make them.
123. 429 U.S. at 499 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1520 DUKE LAW JOURN4L [Vol. 1978:1497
ous courts and commentators have picked up on this general theme in
recent years,' 24 and several state courts have had occasion to consider it
in the context of Mathiason.
In State v. Patterson,125 a suspect had been questioned at the scene
of a crime and temporarily detained. While the Supreme Court of Ha-
waii held that Miranda warnings were not required in the situation
before it, it noted by way of dictum that as a matter of state constitu-
tional law it might not have reached the same result as the United
States Supreme Court did on the facts presented in Mathiason,t26 ad-
ding: "The protections to which an individual is entitled under
Miranda also stem from an independent source in the Hawaii Consti-
tution's privilege against self-incrimination."'' 27
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also touched on the issue,
noting in Commonwealth v. McLaughlin2 ' that
[i]n Pennsylvania "custodial interrogation" has been interpreted to
mean either questioning. . . 'while in custody or while the object of
an investigation of which he is the focus....'
[Bly our placing of "object of an investigation" in the disjunctive
with the custodial requirement, it might appear as though the Penn-
sylvania interpretation of when Miranda warnings are required was
broader than the United States Supreme Court's interpretation.
129
The court observed that the state had "the power to embellish the mini-
124. Among the examples cited by Justice Marshall in his dissent, id, are: South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 384 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308,
324, 338-39 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120-21 (1975)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J.
873 (1975); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion ofthe Burger
Court, 62 KY. L.J. 421 (1974).
Justice Brennan's dissent in Mosley observed that "[u]nderstandably, state courts and legisla-
tures are, as matters of state law, increasingly according protections once provided as federal
rights but now increasingly depreciated by decisions of this Court." 423 U.S. at 121 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (citing several specific examples). Justice Brennan has expanded on this same theme in
a recent law review article. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection ofIndividualRights, 90
HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977).
In Opperman the Supreme Court reversed a South Dakota decision that routine inventory
searches of impounded automobiles, made without probable cause or consent, violated the fourth
amendment. The case was remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion.
428 U.S. at 376. On remand, the South Dakota Supreme Court found that such searches violated
a nearly identical provision in the state constitution and upheld the suppression on that ground.
State v. Opperman, S.D. -, 247 N.W.2d 673 (1976).
125. __ Hawaii -' 581 P.2d 752 (1978).
126. 581 P.2d at 754.
127. Id at 754 n.2 (citing State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971)); see HAWAII
CONST. art. I, § 8.
128. 475 Pa. 97, 379 A.2d 1056 (1977).
129. Id at 101,379 A.2d at 1057-58 (quoting Commonwealth v. D'Nicuola, 448 Pa. 54, 57, 292
A.2d 333, 335 (1972)) (emphasis added by McLaughlin court).
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mum rights guaranteed in the United States Constitution based on our
Pennsylvania Constitution."' 3 ° However, it went on to say that in each
of its prior cases "recognizing the defendant as the focus of an investi-
gation, there was also present a degree of 'deprivation of liberty.' "'13'
Noting that under neither test would the defendant have been entitled
to Mfiranda warnings, 32 the court did not decide whether the Penn-
sylvania Constitution 33 in fact provided a broader guarantee than that
recognized by the United States Supreme Court.
134
The state constitutional provisions relied upon in Patterson'35 and
McLaughlin 36 are substantially similar to the self-incrimination clause
of the fifth amendment. This is also true in Alaska, 137 where the ques-
tion of an independant state constitutional guarantee was raised but not
settled in a 1977 case,' 38 and in Michigan, 139 where an appellate court
rejected a similar claim.141
130. McLaughlin, 475 Pa. at 103 n.4, 379 A.2d at 1058 n.4; see PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
131. 475 Pa. at 102, 379 A.2d at 1058.
132. Id McLaughlin, a Philadelphia city employee, had submitted to an interview with the
city controller in response to an administrative subpoena. The court relied primarily upon Beck-
with v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976); Mathiason was cited, but not discussed.
133. PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
134. See McLaughlin, 475 Pa. at 102-03, 379 A.2d at 1058; Commonwealth v. Anderson, -
Pa. Super. _, 385 A.2d 365, 372-73 n.13 (1978). The Anderson court wrote: "In McLaughlin, our
Supreme Court intimated that [Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution] may encom-
pass a higher standard of protection than the minimum standards of the federal constitu(ion delin-
eated in [Beckwith] and [Mathiason]." Id
135. HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 8.
136. PA. CONsT. art. 1, § 9.
137. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 9.
138. Peterson v. State, 562 P.2d 1350 (Alaska 1977). In Peterson the Alaska Supreme Court
was urged to extend "the principle of Miranda . . . to cover interrogation in non-custodial cir-
cumstances after a police investigation has focused on the [person being interrogated]." Id at
1362. But the court found that there was no need to decide "whether [the Alaska] constitution
extends to the accused any greater right to Miranda warnings than does the federal constitution,"
id, since the defendant in that case in fact received warnings at the time the investigation focused
on him.
139. MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 17.
140. People v. Martin, 78 Mich. App. 518, 260 N.W.2d 869 (1977). Prior to Beckwith and
Mathiason Michigan had employed the "focus" test in determining where Miranda warnings were
required. See note 17 supra. The Martin case presented a situation in which suspicion had "fo-
cused" on the defendant, but he had not been deprived of his freedom of movement within the
meaning of Mathiason. Police had entered a bar and asked to speak with Martin. He voluntarily
accompanied the officers outside, telling them "you have to advise me of my rights." Before they
did so they asked him if he owned a certain car (which they knew in fact to be stolen), and Martin
answered that he did. 78 Mich. App. at 520, 260 N.W.2d at 870.
Under such previous Michigan cases as People v. Ridley, 396 Mich. 603, 242 N.W.2d 402
(1976), and People v. Reed, 393 Mich. 342, 224 N.W.2d 867 (1975), Miranda warnings should
have been given. Those cases, however, had purported to rely upon federal constitutional stand-
ards which under Beckwith and Mathiason were clearly erroneous. The Michigan Court of Ap-
peals considered the possibility of an independent state constitutional basis for the broader
1521
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In Louisiana, however, the right to Miranda-type warnings
"[w]hen any person has been arrested or detained in connection with
the investigation or commission of any offense" is specifically provided
by the state constitution.' 41 In State v. Segers, 42 the defendant had
voluntarily met the sheriff and answered questions before being ad-
vised of his rights. 143 He argued that even if Miranda were not applica-
ble'" his rights under the Louisiana constitution had been violated. 145
The court noted that "[d]efendant is correct when he argues that the
term 'detained' might not mean the same as 'custody' under the
Miranda cases."' 146 But it went on to state that
[i]n interpreting the meaning of 'detained' it is essential to keep in
mind the reasons for the requirement that police inform citizens of
their constitutional rights prior to interrogation. Central to the pur-
pose of this requirement is the protection of the individual's rights
against self-incrimination from the coercive potential of police inter-
rogation. 147
Finding none of the "earmarks of coercion," the court concluded that
there had been no "detention" within the meaning of the Louisiana
constitution. 148
"focus" test. The court noted that the fifth amendment and the state constitutional provisions on
self-incrimination, MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 17, were in fact identical. "Thus, the question arises as
to whether any significant purpose is to be achieved by adopting a policy that places greater con-
straints upon police investigative activity. If so, then a rule more stringent than the United States
Supreme Court's 'custody' standard is possible." 78 Mich. App. at 525, 260 N.W.2d at 872. Find-
ing no such purpose, the court determined that an incriminating statement the defendant made
before receiving Miranda warnings was accordingly admissible:
A more stringent focus standard would lead to the anomalous result that in garner-
ing sufficient evidence through the investigative process to establish probable cause for
an arrest, that evidence may be subsequently excluded merely because a person ques-
tioned was a suspect and, at that time, the primary subject of an investigation. Such a
standard disregards the circumstances under which the evidence was obtained and con-
strains legitimate, good faith investigative efforts, as well as misconduct by law enforce-
ment officers.
Id at 526-27, 260 N.W.2d at 873.
141. LA. CONsT. art. 1, § 13. That section provides in pertinent part:
When any person has been arrested or detained in connection with the investigation or
commission of any offense, he shall be advised fully of the reason for his arrest or deten-
tion, his right to remain silent, his right against self incrimination, his right to the assist-
ance of counsel and, if indigent, his right to court appointed counsel.
142. 355 So.2d 238 (La. 1978), remandedfor resentencing, 357 So.2d I (La. 1978).
143. 355 So.2d at 242. The defendant had heard on the radio that an airplane in which he had
an interest had been searched, id, and over 3000 pounds of marijuana seized. Id at 240.
144. The court, after comparing the facts with those in Mathiason, concluded it was not. Id at
243-44.
145. Id at 244. While the interview was cordial, the sheriff testified that he would not have
permitted the defendant to leave after admitting an ownership interest in the plane. Later he
testified that he did not know whether he would have allowed Segers to leave. Id at 242.
146. Id at 244.
147. Id
148. Id
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While no state supreme court has yet interpreted a state constitu-
tion so as definitely to require Miranda-type warnings in situations that
would not constitute custodial interrogation under the Mathiason
Court's explanation of Miranda, there are indications that several
courts at least are conscious of policy reasons supporting such an inter-
pretation and may be willing to adopt it when an appropriate case
arises.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Miranda held that "when an individual is
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authori-
ties in any significant way. . . the privilege against self incrimination
is jeopardized"' 14 9 and that in such circumstances procedural safe-
guards "must be employed to protect the privilege .... 15 The
Miranda Court did not specifically deal with situations in which an
individual not technically in custody or actually restricted in his free-
dom of movement is nonetheless subjected to the same sort of coercive
pressures found to jeopardize the privilege against self-incrimination in
Miranda-for example, the situation in which a person is "asked" to
come "voluntarily" to the police station for questioning.
Some courts sought to effectuate what they saw as the underlying
policy behind Miranda by including such situations in a broad inter-
pretation of Miranda's definition of "custodial interoga-
tion"---"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his free-
dom of action in any significant way."151
Such a broad interpretation was decisively rejected by the
Supreme Court in Oregon v. Mathiason, which took a much more re-
strictive view emphasizing technical custody or actual, physical depri-
vation of the individual's freedom to walk away from police
questioning. Nonetheless, the decisions of state and federal courts
since Mathiason indicate that those who saw that case as a sharp set-
back for fifth amendment rights may have been too pessimistic. The
courts have shown little tendency to rely upon Mathiason to hold inter-
rogations to be noncustodial in situations not closely analogous to that
in Mathiason itself. Indeed, some courts have continued to find custo-
dial interrogations in situations in which Mathiason would seem to dic-
tate an opposite result. Moreover, at least a few state courts have
149. 384 U.S. at 478.
150. Id at 478-79.
151. Id at 444.
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indicated a possible willingness to find, under state constitutional pro-
visions, a broader area in which Miranda-type warnings are required
than that suggested by Mathiason. Thus, Mathiason may prove only a
temporary check in the progress towards general acceptance of the
value of Miranda warnings in situations where a person not in custody
or actually restricted in his movement is nonetheless subjected to coer-
cive pressures in police questioning.
W. Steven Woodward
